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Abstract
We investigate the impact of Chinese superstition on prices paid by Chinese home buyers in
Seattle, Washington. Chinese consider 8 lucky and 4 unlucky. Empirical results indicate Chi-
nese buyers pay a 1-2% premium for addresses including an 8 and a 1% discount for addresses
including a 4. These results are unrelated to unobserved property quality: no premium exists
when Chinese sell to non-Chinese. Absent explicit identifiers for Chinese individuals, we de-
velop a binomial name classifier using methods from the biomedical and document classification
literature, allowing for falsification tests using other ethnic groups and mitigating ambiguity
attributable to transliteration of Chinese characters into the Latin alphabet.
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The students assimilated too well into American society. The elders back home felt that
they were beginning to lose a lot of the traditional Chinese culture, getting too far away
from the Confucian Analects
 Shawn Wong, Becoming American: The Chinese Experience
1 Introduction
Anecdotal and empirical evidence exists that superstitions held by economic agents affect real estate
market outcomes. For example, less than 5% of condo buildings in New York City contain a 13th floor
as 13 is considered an unlucky number in Western Culture.1 Conversely, a Lucky Seven Road can be
found in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Idaho and Texas. Of course, superstitions  cultural preferences
or norms related to numbers, circumstances, or events  are incompatible with standard models
of rational economic decisions. This study investigates preferences for lucky or unlucky numbers
specific to Chinese culture  hereafter Chinese superstition  in an American real estate market.
We find that individuals with a Chinese cultural background  hereafter Chinese  pay a premium
(discount) for residential properties with addresses that include lucky (unlucky) numbers in Chinese
superstition.
The Chinese words for 8 (八 , b	a) and wealth / prosperity (发 , f	a) are phonetically similar. It
is not surprising that in Chinese superstition, the number 8 is widely believed to be the most lucky
of all single digits. In contrast, the number 4 is considered unlucky as the words for 4 (四, sì) and
death (死 , s) are also phonetically similar. It is possible that Chinese who live in America retain
their cultural heritage and its associated superstition. It is also possible that some or all Chinese have
completely or partially assimilated into American culture and no longer retain cultural superstition.
We test these competing hypothesis by analyzing real estate transaction prices based on the digits
contained in addresses for single-family homes in the Seattle, Washington metro area. Seattle is an
ideal setting for research on Chinese superstition and real estate prices in America as it has been a
prime destination for Chinese immigrants since the 1860s and, relative to the rest of the country,
contains a large number of Chinese home buyers and sellers.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study is the first to investigate
1Sanette Tanaka, A 13th Floor Condo? No Such Luck, Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2013
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effects of Chinese superstition in an American real estate market. Other studies have documented
the relevance of Chinese superstitions in the real estate markets of China and elsewhere.2 Our
results indicate that Chinese superstition is portable and still relevant among Chinese living in
America. Second, this study identifies effects of Chinese superstition at the individual-level using
buyer and seller names. With the exception of Agarwal et al. (2016), previous research has identified
property-level effects using properties located in geographic areas with many Chinese residents.
Using individual-level data, we find Chinese buyers alone responsible for premiums related to lucky
numbers in Chinese superstition and no evidence of discounts attributable to unlucky numbers.
In order to determine if Chinese pay a premium or discount for properties based on the presence
of specific numbers in addresses, it is first necessary to identify whether or not a buyer or seller is
Chinese. Despite myriad housing attributes available in data provided by county assessor offices, to
the best of the authors knowledge, no assessor data set exists that identifies the ethnicity of the buyer
or seller.3 However, many assessor office data sets include buyer and seller names. We capitalize on
the availability of buyer and seller names and develop a binomial classifier that classifies individuals
as Chinese or non-Chinese based on name. In order to train our classifier, we use a supervised
learning algorithm and a labeled data set of Chinese and American participants in the Summer
Olympic Games from 1948 to 2012. Intuitively, the binomial classifier is based on the frequency of
a given name in the Chinese rosters relative to the frequency of that name in the US rosters. Our
procedure is developed using publicly available data sources. The programs are available at the links
below and from the authors upon request.4
Because names and genetics are passed on from one generation to the next, procedures for
identifying ethnicity have been extensively studied in the biomedical field and are known in general
as name-ethnicity matching or, when only the surname is used, surname-ethnicity matching. In
general, the researcher imputes ethnicity using a pre-specified dictionary of names associated with a
given ethnicity. Constructing a dictionary of names using frequent names within an ethnic group or
2Notable studies include Bourassa and Peng (1999), Chau et al. (2001), Shum et al. (2014), Fortin et al. (2014),
and Agarwal et al. (2016)
3The authors have worked with assessor data sets from Seattle, Washington; Phoenix, Arizona; Richmond, Vir-
ginia; Denver, Colorado; Boulder, Colorado; Spokane, Washington; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.
4A copy of the data and classification program is available from the authors upon request and at
Program: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/62967289/olympic%20names%20china.R
Auxiliary Program: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/62967289/fastTDM.R
Olympic Roster Data: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/62967289/olympicRosters.csv
2
frequent names relative to other ethnic groups can be problematic in this setting as many Chinese
names are identical to Korean, Vietnamese, and English surnames when Romanized (Quan et al.,
2006).5 For instance, (张, chang) is a common name in China with Wade-Giles Romanization chang,
while in Korea, 장 is a common name with McCuneReischauer Romanization chang.67 Because of
this, out-of-sample mis-classification is possible when the classifier is trained using only two reference
groups: Chinese and non-Chinese. Based on this ambiguity in the Romanized names, we describe a
multinomial classifier than can be used to classify names as either Chinese, US American, or Korean.
The results indicate that Chinese buyers pay a 1.7% premium for properties that include an 8
in the address. We provide evidence that this premium does not reflect unobserved quality of the
underlying property as Chinese sellers do not command a premium for properties with an 8 in the
address. On the other hand, we find mild evidence that Chinese buyers pay a 1.2% discount for
addresses that end in a 4. These results provide the first evidence that Chinese superstitions impact
transaction prices in an American real estate market. A falsification test finds no evidence that
Korean buyers pay a premium for homes with addresses containing an 8. In the context of cultural
assimilation in America, we find evidence that Chinese preferences for specific numbers are durable
and long-lived, even for minority residents in a city with a multiplicity of cultural preferences and
backgrounds.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Superstition and Real Estate
Previous research examined the role of superstition in the market for apartments in Hong Kong and
mainland China. Chau et al. (2001) analyze data from Hong Kong and find apartments on floor
8 sell at a 2.5% premium, while apartments on floor 4 do not sell at a significant discount. Shum
et al. (2014) analyze data from Chengdu, a provincial capital city in Western China, and find that
5Romanization refers to the transliteration of non-Latin characters using the Latin alphabet.
6Wade-Giles and McCuneReischauer are Romanization systems for Chinese and Korean characters, respectively.
7There have been two main systems of Romanization of Chinese characters in the 20th century. WadeGiles, the
system of transcription in the English-speaking world for most of the 20th century, was developed during the mid-19th
century. In 1958, the Pinyin system officially replaced the WadeGiles system across mainland China and continued
to replace Wade-Giles in other Chinese speaking regions of the world. These two systems use different Latin letters
to spell the same Chinese characters. In mainland China, Pinyin is the only official system, and names on passports
and other official identification must use the Pinyin system.
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apartments located on floors ending with an 8 sell in the secondary market at a premium of 235
RMB per square meter (approximately 7%). No price effects are found in the primary market due
to a uniform local pricing policy. In addition to price effects, apartments on floors ending in an 8
sold 6.9 days sooner than apartments on other floors, on average. Using individual data, Shum et al.
(2014) identify individuals with phone numbers that contain multiple 8 s as superstitious individuals
and find these individuals are more likely to buy an apartment on a floor ending with an 8. Despite
evidence supporting the importance of the number 8, Shum et al. (2014) find no evidence that the
presence of the number 4 is associated with any price discount.
Other researchers found price effects attributable to Chinese superstition in countries outside
China. Absent identifiers for Chinese individuals, Bourassa and Peng (1999) and Fortin et al. (2014)
compare property prices in census units with a large concentration of Chinese to property prices
in other census units. Bourassa and Peng (1999) examine census units in New Zealand and find
positive price effects associated with 8 s in census units with a large percentage of Chinese residents;
no such effects are found for similar properties in census units with few Chinese residents. Similar to
Bourassa and Peng (1999), Fortin et al. (2014) compare property prices in census units with a large
numbers of Chinese to property prices in other census units in the Canadian city of Vancouver,
British Columbia. Fortin et al. (2014) find houses with addresses ending in an 8 sell at a 2.5%
premium in the census units with many Chinese residents; in the same census units, addresses that
end in a 4 sell at a 2.2% discount. No price effects are found in census units with relatively few
Chinese residents for either number.
Although Bourassa and Peng (1999) and Fortin et al. (2014) provide highly suggestive evidence
of impacts of Chinese superstition on real estate prices outside China, their price effects must be
attributed to the property and not the individual. Absent any information on the ethnicity of
buyers and sellers, these studies can not identify any individual-level effects attributable to Chinese
buyers or sellers. In contrast, Agarwal et al. (2016) identify individual-level effects in the Singapore
apartment market using explicit Chinese identifiers present in the data. Agarwal et al. (2016) find
Chinese buyers pay a 0.9% premium for apartments with numbers ending in 8 and 1.1% discount for
apartments with numbers ending in 4. Similar to (Agarwal et al., 2016), we identify individual-level
effects, but unlike (Agarwal et al., 2016), we impute ethnicity.
In addition to real estate markets, empirical research has also found Chinese superstition effects
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in other markets. Woo et al. (2008) and Ng et al. (2010) find evidence using winning bids for license
plate auctions in Hong Kong. Yang (2011) document that retailers in China manipulate patterns
of numbers appearing on price tags in order to exploit preferences for lucky and unlucky numbers.
Moreover, Yang (2011) conclude that Chinese consumers pay more for retail goods because of this
manipulation.
2.2 Name-Ethnicity Matching
In addition to testing for the effect of cultural preferences on real estate prices, this study develops
a binomial classifier for placing individuals into specific ethnic groups based on name. The need for
a name-ethnicity classification scheme is more practical than ideal, and has historically been based
on data available to researchers in the social and biomedical sciences. Treeratpituk and Giles (2012)
put this concisely
unlike names, ethnic information is often unavailable due to practical, political or legal
reasons. (page 1142)
Like most empirical real estate research, we use data from the King County Assessor that includes
buyer and seller names but does not include ethnic identifiers.
Motivated by genetic commonalities within ethnic groups, name-ethnic matching has been used
extensively in biomedical research (Coldman et al., 1988; Burchard et al., 2003; Fiscella and Fremont,
2006). A typical approach identifies strong predictors of ethnicity using a labeled data set that
includes both the ethnicity and name for each individual. Coldman et al. (1988) use death certificates
that include name and ethnicity, Gill et al. (2005) use surnames and country of origin, and Ambekar
et al. (2009) use names of famous natives obtained from Wikipedia.
In this study, we use Olympic Games rosters for both the United States and China from 1948 to
2012 as a representative list of names from each country. Olympic Games team rosters contain both
males and females, and the team members must meet specific residence and citizenship requirements
in order to appear on the national team for each country. These features makes Olympic Games
team rosters an ideal choice for developing representative lists of names by country when compared
to other potential labeled data sets such as Wikipedia or the Internet Movie Database, Ambekar
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et al. (2009) and Rachevsky and Pu (2011).89
As names are a specific form of textual data, our method relates to other studies that view
text as data. We use a tokenization approach where units of text are represented by exchangeable
collections of words or tokens. Based on the set of tokens, each text can be scored or classified into
two or more groups. For example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) score news outlets as Republican
or Democrat, Loughran and McDonald (2011) score 10k filings as positive or negative, and Nowak
and Smith (2016) score real estate listings as low quality or high quality. In order to score the text,
researchers can either use a pre-specified dictionary of topic-specific words or build a dictionary
based on a corpus of labeled or unlabeled text. We create a dictionary of Chinese and non-Chinese
names using sparsity-inducing methods similar to Taddy (2013). Using the names and estimated
weights, each name in the assessor data can be scored as either Chinese or not Chinese.
The purpose of the classification procedure is to predict ethnicity for names in the assessor
data. Because of this, the performance of the classifier should not be evaluated on in-sample mis-
classification for the Olympic Games rosters; rather, performance should be evaluated based on
theoretical results for the out-of-sample mis-classification rate of the assessor data. Given the number
of unique names in the Olympic Games rosters is comparable to the number of Olympians, overfitting
is likely a problem. Because of this, we use an `1 regularized logistic regression commonly used in
the document classification literature, Hastie et al. (2015). Regularizing the coefficients using the
`1 norm yields coefficient estimates that result in lower out-of-sample mis-classification compared
to un-regularized estimators and alternative `p coefficient regularizations (Ng, 2004). Furthermore,
unlike the maximum likelihood estimator, the regularized estimator is feasible even when the data
are separable (Hastie et al., 2015).
3 Data and Methodology
We estimate an hedonic price model in order to explain observed variation in residential real estate
transaction prices in King County, Washington attributable to the presence of lucky or unlucky
numbers in the address. The hedonic model contains indicator variables for individual buyers and
sellers classified as Chinese. We classify based on name using the rosters of the athletes on the
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Database_download
9http://www.imdb.com/interfaces
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Chinese and US Summer Olympic Games over a 60 year period. The data sources and estimation
methods used are described in detail below.
3.1 Data
The data sets used in this study come from two sources. The first data set includes the rosters of
all Summer Olympic Games teams from the United States and China beginning 1948 and ending
2012. These data form the basis for the supervised learning algorithm used to identify individuals
as Chinese, as described below. The Summer Olympic rosters were downloaded from the Sports
Reference website.10 Figure 1 shows the 100 most common names appearing in the US and China
national Olympic teams over the 1948-2012 period. In Figure 1, the larger the font size, the more
frequently that name appears on the Summer Olympic Games team rosters.
The second data set comes from the King County Assessor's Office.11 This data set includes
information on all real estate transactions in King County beginning January 1, 1990 and ending
December 31, 2015. The data set includes information about the property (type of property, type of
transaction, address, etc.), the transaction price, the buyer name, and the seller name. We use data
on sales of single-family homes. After removing 1% of outlying observations based on a preliminary
hedonic regression, the final sample contains 508,916 single family home sales.12 Summary statistics
for commonly reported property attributes are reported in Table 2. The average residential property
transacted during the sample period was built in 1978, had a price of $330,555, just under 2,000
square feet of living space, 3.3 bedrooms and about 1.5 bathrooms.
We identify individuals as having a Chinese cultural or ethnic background based on name us-
ing a binomial classifier. After training the classifier using names on Olympic Team rosters, we
calculate the probability that a given buyer's name will be found on the Chinese Olympic team
rosters, Pr (ChinaBuyer). Using this probability, we create an indicator variable chinaBuy which
is equal to 1 if 0.8 < Pr (ChinaBuyer) and equal to 0 otherwise. Alternative cutoff values for this
indicator variable were considered, but changing the threshold probability across values in the set
{0.55, 0.60, ..., 0.90, 0.95} did not alter the empirical results in any meaningful way. The probabil-
10http://www.sports-reference.com/olympics/
11http://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/assessor.aspx
12Based on deed records available on the King County Assessor's website, a significant portion of the outlying
transactions were found to be associated with non arms-length transactions, inter-family transfers, fire damage, or
significant renovation.
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ity Pr (ChinaSeller) and indicator variable chinaSell are created in a similar manner using seller
names.
Summary statistics for the probabilities, indicator variables, and the presence of 8 s and 4 s in
addresses, are shown on Table 2. 4.3% of all buyers are classified as having a name suggesting a
Chinese cultural background and 1.9% of all sellers are classified as such. About 33% of the houses
in the sample have an 8 in the address, and about 45% have a 4 in the address. About 9% of the
homes transacted in the sample have a 4 or 8 as the final digit in the house price.
3.2 Binomial Classifier
For each n = 1, ..., N , define an indicator variable yn = 1 if the Olympic athlete is on the Chinese
national team and yn = 0 if the Olympic athlete is on the US national team. Using this binary
variable, the probability that an Olympic athlete will be from China is calculated using a logit
function. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, we consider this a binomial
classifier.
The explanatory variables for the logit model are created from the full names on Olympic Games
team rosters. We assume each full name, Fn, can be represented as an exchangeable collection of
names or tokens chosen from a set of P names. The exchangeability assumption implies that we make
no distinction between first and last names. Alternatively, each full name Fn can be represented as a
P × 1 vector Xn with elements Xnp. Here, Xnp = 1 if the pth name is in Fn and Xnp = 0 otherwise.
For instance, the associated vector Xn for American Olympic swimmer Fn = {Michael, Phelps}
has a 1 in the element associated with Michael, a 1 in the element associated with Phelps, and 0
everywhere else. Using these explanatory variables, the probability that yn = 1 is given by
Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ) = e
φ0+
∑
p
Xnpφp
1 + e
φ0+
∑
p
Xnpφp
(1)
In Equation (1), when 0 < φp (φp < 0), the presence of name p increases (decreases) the likelihood
that Fn comes from the Chinese Olympic team roster. When φp = 0, name p does not help to
predict yn. The parameter φ0 controls the unconditional Pr(yn = 1).
For fixed P , φp can be consistently estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. In the
Olympic Roster setting, the assumption of fixed P is difficult to defend as there are 6,502 unique
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names across N = 9, 836 Olympic athletes from both the US and China. For sets of explanatory
variable with these dimensions, maximum likelihood solutions are at worst degenerate when N < P
and at best unreliable when P ≈ N (Hastie and Qian, 2014). A practical approach decreases P
by filtering out names that occur fewer than C times in the data. In this case, modest filtering
rules result in a large P while more aggressive filtering rules could remove names with significant
predictive power. We retain the P = 615 names that occur C = 5 or more times in the data. In
unreported results, we find that the results are not sensitive when using C = 10 or C = 20.
Because P remains large even after filtering out less common names, we utilize a penalized
likelihood procedure that mitigates overfitting. In particular, we place an `1 penalty on the individual
φp parameters and minimize the following penalized likelihood function
−
∏
n
Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ)yn [1− Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ)]1−yn + λ
∑
p
|φp| (2)
The first term in Equation (2) is the sample likelihood, and the second term represents a penalty on
the coefficient vector. The parameter λ is a tuning parameter that controls the penalty.1314 Define
the solution to Equation (2) as φ∗(λ). When the context is clear, we omit the dependence on λ and
write φ∗ instead.
The choice of λ determines the size of the penalty on φ. When λ = 0, there is no penalty on
φ and φ∗(0) is the maximum likelihood estimator. As λ increases, there is a greater penalty on
large φ and φ∗ is shrunk towards the zero vector. Unlike the `2 penalty, the shape of the `1 penalty
yields a sparse solution where some entries of φ∗ can be set equal to 0. As mentioned above, when
φ∗p = 0, token p cannot be used to classify yn. With this interpretation, minimizing Equation (2)
performs both variable selection and coefficient estimation. If we were to forgo the logit model and
instead estimate a linear probability model with an `1 penalty on the coefficients, the estimator
would become the well-known LASSO estimator, Tibshirani (1996).15
By including the penalty term, φ∗ is less likely to overfit the data in-sample and can be used for
meaningful out-of-sample classifications (Ng, 2004). For this application, out-of-sample performance
13In our analysis, we experiment with values near the 5-fold cross-validated λ. The results are robust to λ near the
cross-validated choice of λ
14We use the glmnet package in R to solve Equation 2. The solution is found by using a quadratic approximation
to the true penalized likelihood.
15LASSO is an acronym for least absolute shrinkage and selection operator.
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(mis-classification) is fundamental to the results. By creating explanatory variables for buyer and
seller names in the assessor data in the same way, we can then calculate Pr (ChinaBuyer) and
Pr (ChinaSeller) and the associated indicator variables using φ∗ and Equation1.
In addition to out-of-sample considerations, we also prefer the regularized estimator based on
the configuration of the data. P = 615 names may be sufficiently small compared to N = 9, 836
Olympians to justify use of maximum likelihood methods. However, many names are specific to
either the Chinese or US rosters. For instance, michael is only found on US team rosters. In this
case, the data are considered separable, and the maximum likelihood estimator does not exist as
φ∗michael(0) = −∞.16 However, separable data sets can still be employed using the regularized
estimator in Equation (2) as 0 < λ precludes infinite values for φ∗.
3.3 Multinomial Classifier
As discussed above, different Chinese and Korean names can be identical when Romanized. In this
situation, the binomial classifier might erroneously classify Korean buyers and sellers as Chinese.
Using a multinomial classifier instead of a binomial classifier in this setting provides two benefits.
First and foremost, adding a third type can decrease classification error relative to the binomial
classifier. Specifically, Romanized names that are common to both China and Korea will not default
to being classified as Chinese as in the binomial classifier. Second, extending the classification
scheme by allowing for a Korean type also provides for an interesting falsification test. Unlike
Chinese superstition, there does not exist any evidence that the number 8 is lucky or unlucky in
Korean superstition.
The binomial classifier described in the previous section can be generalized to a multinomial
classifier using a multinomial likelihood approach. The multinomial classification model contains
k = 1, ...,K types. Each individual n = 1, ..., N is associated with a type yn ∈ {1, ...,K}. Given the
vector Xn, the probability of being type k is given by
16Using Eq 1, the individual likelihood of a Chinese Olympian, yn = 1, is not affected by φmichael as xn,michael = 0
for all Chinese Olympians. The maximum likelihood estimator maximizes the sample likelihood L(φ) =
∏
n
Pr(yn =
1|Xn, φ)yn [1− Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ)]1−yn . Suppose φ1 maximizes L(φ). Now, consider φ2 = φ1− emichael where emichael
is the basis vector with a 1 in the michael slot and 0 elsewhere. Using Eq 1, Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ2) = Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ1)
for all Chinese Olympians and US Olympians not named michael, Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ1) < Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ2) for all US
Olympians names michael. Therefore, L(φ1) < L(φ2), and φ1 cannot be the maximum likelihood estimator.
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Pr(yn = k|Xn, φ) = e
φ0k+X
′
nφk∑
k e
φ0k+X′nφk
(3)
In Equation (3), φk = (φ1k, ..., φPk)
′ is a P × 1 vector of parameters for type k. When 0 < φpk
(φpk < 0), the presence of name p increases (decreases) the likelihood that Fn is type k. In the
interest of out-of-sample performance, φk can be estimated by maximizing a penalized likelihood
similar to Equation 2. Using φ∗k, we calculate probabilities Pr (ChinaBuyer) and Pr (KoreanBuyer)
and create the indicators chinaBuy and koreaBuy using the same 0.8 cutoff used in the binomial
classifier. Indicators for sellers are created similarly.
3.4 Hedonic Price Model
In order to isolate the response of Chinese buyers and sellers to the presence of certain numbers,
we use the property address recorded in the King County Assessors Office real estate transactions
database. In these data, the property address includes both the building number and street number.
For example, 248 Main Street has a single 8 in the address while 248 8th Street has two 8 s in the
address. In the transaction data, we convert all character representations of numbers to numerics.
For instance, 248 Eighth Street is converted to 248 8th Street.
Indicator variables for the presence of 8 s and 4 s are created using the property address. The
variable any8 = 1 if there is any 8 in the property address and any8 = 0 otherwise. The variable
total8 is equal to the total number of 8 s in the property address. In order to determine if the building
number and street have different effects, we set buildingAny8 = 1 if the building number contains an
8 and buildingAny8 = 0 otherwise. Following Fortin et al. (2014), we also create buildingLast8 = 1
if the last digit of the house number is equal to 8 and set buildingLast8 = 0 otherwise. Indicators
for the number 4 are created in a similar manner. As an example, a single family home at 248 8th
Street would have any8=1, buildingAny8=1, buildingLast8=1, total8=2, any4=1, buildingAny4=1,
buildingLast4=0, and total4=1.
We estimate a hedonic model in order to determine if individuals with a Chinese cultural back-
ground are willing to pay more or less for a single family home based on the numbers found in the
address. We estimate the following hedonic price model for house i in zip code z sold at time period
t
11
pizt = xiztβ + ψzizt + µzt + uizt. (4)
In Equation 4, pizt is the log of the sale price, xict includes the log square footage, bedrooms, bath-
rooms, and age of the property, zizt includes indicator variables for Chinese (chinaBuy, chinaSell),
numbers appearing in the street address (any8, buildingAny8, etc.), and the relevant interaction
terms (any8×chinaBuy, any8×chinaSell, etc.), µzt is a Zip Code - Year fixed-effect that captures
time-varying unobservable neighborhood heterogeneity, and uizt is an unobservable error term cap-
turing other factors that affect residential property transaction prices. We two way cluster-correct
the estimated standard errors in Equation (4) at the Zip Code and year level.
In Equation (4), the coefficients for chinaBuy and chinaSell indicate if Chinese buyers or sellers,
respectively, pay more or less for residential properties regardless of the numbers in the address.
When the coefficient on chinaBuy is positive, Chinse buyers pay a premium when purchasing a
residential property. Of course, as the hedonic model will never fully capture the true quality of a
property, and a positive coefficient on chinaBuy can also indicate that individuals with a Chinese
background purchase properties with higher unobserved quality.
Our primary variables of interest are the interaction terms like any8×chinaBuy. The coefficient
on any8 × chinaBuy indicates any premium or discount Chinese pay when purchasing properties
with any 8 s in the property address. This premium or discount is attributable solely to the numbers
in the property address and, by the inclusion of chinaBuy as a stand-alone coefficient, is in addition
to any market wide premium paid by Chinese buyers. If Chinese buyers factor in Chinese superstition
when purchasing a property, we expect the coefficient on any8 × chinaBuy and other interaction
terms that include chinaBuy and 8 s to be positive.
If properties that include 8 s purchased by Chinese are of higher quality, a positive coefficient on
any8× chinaBuy could indicate unobserved quality and not the influence of Chinese superstitions.
Estimates of the coefficient on the interaction term any8×chinaSell can help address this problem.
If the estimated coefficient on any8× chinaSell is not different from 0, this is strong evidence that
properties sold by Chinese with an 8 in the address are not of higher or lower quality than other
properties. Altogether, both a statistically positive coefficient estimate on any8× chinaBuy and a
coefficient estimate indistinguishable from zero on any8×chinaSell indicates Chinese buyers paying
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a premium for properties based solely on the presence of an 8 in the address irrespective of the
unobserved quality of the property.
In contrast to Bourassa and Peng (1999) and Fortin et al. (2014) who interact an indicator
variable for census units that include a large portion of Chinese, say chineseTract, with indicators
for 8 in the address, we identify Chinese buyers and sellers.17 This subtle difference is important if
non-Chinese recognize the effects of Chinese superstitions and purchase properties for speculative
purposes. That is, a positive coefficient on any8× chineseTract can indicate a positive price effect
for the number 8 for both Chinese and non-Chinese alike. In contrast, a positive coefficient on
any8× chinaBuy identifies a positive price effect specific to Chinese buyers.
4 Results
4.1 Ethnic-Name Matching
The ethnic name matching procedure is a key element of the empirical analysis. Figure 2 shows the
solution path, φ∗(λ), for various values of λ in Equation (2). Figure 2 shows both the size of the
coefficients and the number of non-zero coefficients increasing as λ decreases. Furthermore, Figure 2
indicates that each coefficient becomes non-zero at different values of λ. For large values of λ, only
the names that are the strongest predictors have non-zero φ∗. Therefore, the choice of λ directly
determines both the dictionary of Chinese and US names (variable selection) and the predictive
power of the names (coefficient estimation).
The choice of λ is determined using a cross-validation procedure. λcv is the 5-fold cross-validated
choice of λ, and λ1se is the largest λ such that the median cross-validated log-likelihood is within
one standard error of the log-likelihood evaluated at λcv. Although some practitioners favor using
φ∗(λ1se) as it is more conservative in terms of both variable selection and coefficient estimation
(Hastie et al., 2015), parameter estimates from Equation (4) are nearly identical when using either
λcv or λ1se. Therefore, we report only the results using φ
∗(λcv), hereafter, φ∗cv.
Estimates of φ∗cv, the name matching parameter from Equation (1), along with the largest
estimated values are displayed in Table 1. Names that most strongly predict being on the United
17Bourassa and Peng (1999) identify tracts based on immigration and Fortin et al. (2014) identify tracts based on
census data.
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States Olympic team roster are kevin, amy, michael. Names that most strongly predict being on the
Chinese Olympic team roster are li, yin, xu. Using Equation 1, the implied Pr(yn = 1) for kevin,
amy, michael is equal to 0 when rounding to 6 digits; the implied Pr(yn = 1) for li, yin, xu is equal
to 1. Thus, the presence of any of these names alone in any buyer or seller name is a strong indicator
of ethnicity.
Not surprisingly, the strongest predictors are names that are among the most frequent names in
Figure 1. However, there is not a monotonic relationship between frequency and predictive power.
For instance, dan, lou, lee, long are found on both Chinese and United States Olympic team rosters;
dan occurs 17 (39) times in the United States (Chinese) Olympic rosters and is not a strong indicator
of ethnicity. As mentioned above, the `1 penalty in Equation 2 is such that φ
∗
cv for weak predictors
are set exactly to 0. The associated φ∗cv for the 15 names that occur in both the Chinese and US
rosters are equal to 0 indicating that these 15 names cannot be used to predict ethnicity in the
assessor data.
Using φ∗cv, the probability that a buyer or seller is Chinese can be calculated using Equation
1. Figure 3 displays the empirical cumulative distribution for these probabilities for the entire
set of buyers and sellers. In the data, 3.5% of the transactions have a buyer name with 0.95 <
Pr(ChineseBuyer). A manual inspection of the names by several Chinese nationals confirms this
high predicted probability. Based on Figure 3, our cutoff probability of 0.8 for the indicator variable
appears to be appropriate. As indicated in Table 2, 4.3% of transactions are classified as involving
Chinese buyers, and 1.9% of transactions involve Chinese sellers. Figure 4 shows the fraction of
transactions that included either a Chinese buyer or seller over the sample period. The fraction of
Chinese buyers increased at a steady rate beginning in 1990 through 2008. After 2008, the fraction
of Chinese buyers increased more rapidly, peaking at more than 8% of all buyers in 2013. In contrast,
the percentage of Chinese sellers exhibits more steady growth rate throughout the sample period.
The percentage of Chinese buyers and sellers varies across locations in Seattle. Figure 5 shows
the fraction of Chinese buyers in King County by census tract and Figure 6 shows the locations of
the individual properties associated with Chinese buyers. Although transactions involving Chinese
buyers are distributed throughout King County, significant clusters of transactions involving Chinese
buyers can be seen on Figure 6. The fraction of Chinese buyers appears to be highly concentrated
in two locations where more than 20% of buyers are identified as Chinese by the binomial classifier.
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Similar high home ownership rates and clustering patterns among Chinese is also reported by Painter
et al. (2004) in their study using data from the Los Angeles Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical
Area.
One cluster of Chinese buyers is in the Beacon Hill area of Seattle just east of I-5 and the Seattle-
Tacoma International Airport. It is interesting to note that the Chinatown International-District is
located 3 miles north of the Beacon Hill area.18 The other location is the Newcastle / Cougar Hills
area south of I-90 and east of I-405.
The names with the largest coefficients for each country in the multinomial classifier are pre-
sented in Table 4. Not surprisingly, the strongest predictors for Chinese names in the multinomial
model are comparable to the strongest names in the binomial model given in Table 1. The total
number of buyers and sellers for each type are presented in Table 5. The total number of Chinese
buyers and sellers in Table 5 is fewer than the total numbers in Table 3. A comparison of the counts
in the two tables indicates that the binomial classifier is classifying buyers and sellers in the assessor
data as Chinese who are classified as Korean when using the multinomial classifier.
4.2 Hedonic Results for the Binomial Classifier
We use four alternative specifications for the hedonic model in Equation 4 that contain different
indicator variables for the presence of lucky and unlucky numbers in addresses in different forms.
These alternative models help establish the robustness of the results. Model 1 contains any8 or
any4 and interactions with chinaBuy and chinaSell. Model 2 uses total8 or total4. Model 3 uses
buildingAny8 or buildingAny4. The final model specification, Model 4, contains an indicator variable
(buildingLast8 or buildingLast4 ) for the presence of an 8 or 4 as the last digit of the house number.
This specification in Model 4 matches the one used by Fortin et al. (2014). We interact the indicator
variables for lucky and unlucky numbers in addresses with indicator variables for Chinese buyers
and sellers, which allows for the effect of Chinese superstition to vary depending on which party in
the transaction has these preferences.
The results for the hedonic regression model defined by in Equation (4) are presented in Table
6. All models contain indicator variables for transactions with Chinese buyers and sellers. The
estimated parameters on these stand-alone indicator variables are all negative and statistically
18http://www.visitseattle.org/visitor-information/
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different from zero; Chinese buyers and sellers in King County tend to purchase single family homes
at a discount relative to other buyers. This price effect could reflect a preference of Chinese for time-
invariant low-quality properties. Alternatively, this price effect could also reflect the time-varying
condition of the property or features specific to the transacting parties. For example, Chinese could
purchase high-quality properties that are currently in poor condition.19 The discount could also
be an indication that Chinese have bargaining power relative to the average seller, Harding et al.
(2003). However, we find the bargaining power explanation unlikely as the coefficient on chinaSell
is also negative and smaller than the coefficient on chinaBuy.
The results from Model 1 suggest no significant discount for a property address with an 8 in
the address across King County. The parameters of interest are the estimates on the interaction of
any8 and with the indicators for Chinese buyers and sellers. The interation parameter estimates on
Table 6 indicate that Chinese buyers pay a 1.7% premium for property addresses that include an 8.
Chinese sellers receive a 1.4% premium when selling a property with an 8 in the address, no matter
what the ethnicity of the buyer. The premium when selling is puzzling but could represent either
model mis-specification or mis-classification of Chinese buyers and sellers when using the binomial
classifier. The premium when selling could also indicate a larger reservation price for Chinese who
currently derive utility from properties than include an 8 in the address.
Columns 2 - 4 on Table 6 investigate alternative specifications for the presence of 8 s in addresses.
Model 2 includes a variable reflecting the total number of 8 s in the property address. Again, the
presence of an 8 in an address does not carry any premium in the overall sample. However, Chinese
home buyers are willing to pay a 1.4% premium for each additional 8 in a home's address. Chinese
sellers receive a 0.9% premium for each additional 8 in an address; however, this result is only
significant at the 5% level. Model 3 includes an indicator variable for the presence of an 8 anywhere
in the building address. Results from Model 3 indicate that buyer and seller premiums for 8 s
appearing in the house number are similar to the premium for an 8 anywhere in the address.
Model 4, shown on in column 4 on Table 6, contains an indicator variable for houses where the
final digit of the house number is 8. The average single family home transaction in King County
involving a property with an 8 as the final digit of the house number does not carry any premium
19Here, we use quality to define the time-invariant or slowly-varying state of the property (location to amenities,
neighborhood quality, school district, etc.) and condition to indicate the time-varying state of the property (fire
damage, flood damage, renovated kitchen, new roof, etc.).
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when compared to other properties. However, results in Table 6 echo the same puzzling result from
Model 1 where Chinese sellers command a 2.1% premium.
Table 7 presents a similar analysis using 4 s in addresses. Again, Chinese buyers purchase single
family homes for a price 2.0% to 2.4% below average and sell single family homes at a price about
5.3% below average in King County. Similar to Fortin et al. (2014), Models 1-3 find no evidence
that Chinese buyers react to the presence of 4 in the address. However, Model 4 indicates Chinese
buyers pay a 1.2% discount when the last digit of the house number is a 4.
The results from the binomial classifier suggest that single family home transaction prices in
Seattle, Washington reflect cultural preferences for lucky and unlucky numbers. King County has
a diverse population that included about 15% of the population identifying themselves as Asian
in the 2010 Census. This is a substantially more diverse ethnic mix than the setting examined by
Agarwal et al. (2016) and Shum et al. (2014), who analyze the premium (discount) associated with
the presence of 8 (4 ) in majority Chinese settings. Chinese in Seattle interact more frequently with
people from a western background than residents of China or Singapore, and are also continually
bombarded by media with a western orientation. Some Seattle residents identified as Chinese could
be second, third forth or more generation Chinese-Americans. These results suggest that Chinese
cultural preferences for specific numbers persist over time, and in the presence of significant inter-
action with, and exposure to non-Chinese cultural preferences.
The estimated premia associated with the presence of 8 s in addresses, and the estimated discount
associated with the presence of 4 s in addresses, in this paper are smaller than those reported in
Fortin et al. (2014), and substantially smaller than those reported in Shum et al. (2014). The data
used by Shum et al. (2014) come from a city in China, where cultural preferences for numbers should
be substantially stronger than in Seattle. Fortin et al. (2014) have no information about the ethnicity
of buyers and sellers; instead, they exploit information about the demographic characteristics of the
Census Tracts where the houses are located in Vancouver.
4.3 Hedonic Results for Multinomial Classifier
We next present results when using the multinomial classifier to classify buyer and seller ethnicity.
Results for Chinese buyers are presented in Table 8, and results for Korean buyers are presented
in Table 9. The results for the Chinese buyers and sellers are comparable to the results in Table 6;
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the results from the previous section are robust to use of the multinomial classifier. We find further
evidence that Chinese buyers are willing to pay a slight premium for properties that include an
8 in the address. Interestingly, the puzzling, statistically significant result for the buildingLast8×
chinaSell variable in Table 6 is no longer significant in Table 8. The disappearance of this significance
indicates that the multinomial classifier is preferred to the binomial classifier in terms of its ability
to assign ethnicity to buyers and sellers in the sample.
More importantly, as expected, we find that Korean buyers do not pay a premium for properties
that include an 8 in the address. As a whole, the null result for Koreans in Table 9 and the sig-
nificance for Chinese buyers in Table 8 provide two important implications. First, there is evidence
that Chinese buyers factor in Chinese superstition and are willing to pay more for properties that
include 8 s in the address. This result is robust to any mis-classification attributable to the Roman-
ization of Chinese characters. Second, the multinomial classifier generates a simple counterfactual:
the absence of any significant price effects for Korean buyers and sellers gives further credence to
the significant results found among Chinese buyers and sellers in the sample.
5 Conclusion
A growing body of evidence suggests that superstition is manifest in economic outcomes. We use
a novel approach to identify the ethnicity of home buyers and sellers in King County, Washington
over a fifteen year period. The results reveal that the presence of the number 8 in an address has
a expected premium for Chinese buyers of 1.7%. A similar premium also exists in other numeric
formats, including the total number of 8 s in the address and an 8 as the final digit of the house
number. However, the presence of the number 4 in an address does not generate a substantial
discount.
The results in this paper extend economists' understanding of the extent to which superstition
can affect economic outcomes. The city of Seattle is ethnically and culturally diversity, and many
of the ethnic Chinese buying and selling houses during the study period could have lived in the
US for generations. The presence of a statistically significant relationship between a proxy for the
presence of cultural preferences for specific numbers and single family home prices indicates Chinese
superstition is relatively durable and still present in Chinese living in America.
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In addition, the supervised learning approach to identifying ethnicity based only on names used
here can be applied in a number of other settings where quantitative data on language is used (Davis
and Abdurazokzoda, 2015). Researchers often use data where names are available but information
on ethnicity is not. For example, government regulators, elected officials, political candidates, CEOs,
Corporate Board members, judges, and athletes on professional sports teams are often identified by
name. However, information about their ethnic background is often limited but is still of significant
interest to researchers. The supervised learning approach used here can be applied in all of these
settings in order to assess the likely ethnic background of individuals.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Olympic Athlete Names and Logit Coefficients
PANEL A: 10 Strongest Predictors for United States Olympians
Name Count Relative Frequency φ̂∗
kevin 40 0.004 -6.593
amy 29 0.003 -5.824
michael 67 0.007 -5.514
mike 112 0.011 -5.460
bob 91 0.009 -5.378
jim 89 0.009 -5.327
bill 95 0.010 -5.326
tom 81 0.008 -5.285
steve 72 0.007 -5.184
mark 57 0.006 -5.145
PANEL B: 10 Strongest Predictors for Chinese Olympians
Name Count Relative Frequency φ̂∗
li 274 0.028 5.775
yin 10 0.001 5.764
xu 60 0.006 5.712
liu 138 0.014 5.701
sun 61 0.006 5.679
lin 42 0.004 5.468
song 26 0.003 5.239
guo 37 0.004 5.181
yu 52 0.005 5.146
zhu 42 0.004 5.111
Table 1 shows the 10 strongest predictors for Summer Olympic national team members (φ̂∗s) for the United
States and China based on the penalized logit estimator defined by Equation 2. Count is the total number
of times the name appears on both rosters; Relative Frequency is the percentage of times the name appears
on both rosters. The strength of the predictor is based on the absolute value of φ̂∗. Coefficients with more
negative (positive) values are strong indicators of a name coming from the United States (Chinese) Summer
Olympic team.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Statistic Min Mean Median Max St. Dev.
Sale Price ($1,000s) 45.000 330.555 275.000 1,700.000 208.834
Square Feet of Living Space 480 1,986.760 1,880 4,850 775.857
Year Built 1900 1967.660 1972 2014 27.600
Bedrooms 1 3.328 3 6 0.841
Bathrooms 1 1.498 1 3 0.590
Sale Year 1990 2002.143 2002 2015 6.621
pr(Chinese Seller) 0.000 0.041 0.002 1.000 0.125
pr(Chinese Buyer) 0.000 0.061 0.001 1.000 0.191
chinaSell 0 0.019 0 1 0.136
chinaBuy 0 0.043 0 1 0.203
Any 8 in Address 0 0.332 0 1 0.471
Last Digit 8 in Address 0 0.088 0 1 0.283
Any 4 in Address 0 0.453 0 1 0.498
Last Digit 4 in Address 0 0.096 0 1 0.295
Real estate transaction data comes from the King County Assessor's Office.
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Table 3: Number of Identifying Transactions, Binomial Classifier
Variable Count
Chinese Seller 9,570
Chinese Buyer 21,853
Any 8 in Address (any8) 169,182
Last digit 8 in address (buildingLast8) 44,748
Any 4 in Address any4) 230,520
Last digit 4 in address (buildingLast4) 48,966
The Chinese ethnicity indicator variables chinaBuy and chinaSell are created using the binomial classifier.
any8 is an indicator for the presence of any 8 in the address. buildingLast8 is an indicator if the house
number ends in an 8. any4 is an indicator for the presence of any 4 in the address. buildingLast4 is an
indicator if the house number ends in a 4
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Table 4: Olympic Athlete Names and 10 Largest Multinomial Coefficients
China φ̂∗ Korea φ̂∗ United States φ̂∗
li 8.838 yeong 8.778 kevin 6.872
liu 8.782 cheol 8.773 white 5.873
xu 8.404 choi 8.702 michael 4.329
zhu 8.313 ja 8.523 amy 3.777
zhou 8.273 sin 8.487 david 3.215
xie 8.190 hye 8.286 mike 3.091
he 8.179 won 8.273 ann 3.070
zhao 8.159 seung 8.248 bob 3.011
guo 8.140 seong 8.022 bill 3.010
shen 7.979 yeo 7.604 mary 2.992
Table 4 shows the 10 largest estimated regression coefficients associated with Chinese, Korean, and American
names from the multinomial classifier.
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Table 5: Multinomial Classifier Transaction Counts
Ethnicity Indicator Number of Transactions
chinaSell 7,464
chinaBuy 19,287
koreaSell 2,784
koreaBuy 4,495
The ethnicity indicator variables chinaBuy and chinaSell, koreaBuy, and koreaSell are created using the
multinomial classifier.
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Table 6: Buyer and Seller Ethnicity and 8 s in Addresses, Binomial Classifier
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
chinaSell −0.055∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
chinaBuy −0.030∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
any8 0.001
(0.003)
any8 × chinaSell 0.014∗∗
(0.005)
any8 × chinaBuy 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004)
total8 0.000
(0.003)
total8 × chinaSell 0.009∗
(0.004)
total8 × chinaBuy 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003)
buildingAny8 0.001
(0.003)
buildingAny8 × chinaSell 0.012
(0.006)
buildingAny8 × chinaBuy 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
buildingLast8 0.002
(0.001)
buildingLast8 × chinaSell 0.018∗∗
(0.006)
buildingLast8 × chinaBuy 0.003
(0.004)
Num. obs. 508916 508916 508916 508916
R2 (full model) 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871
Zip Code - Year FE Y Y Y Y
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. chinaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and chinaBuy is an indicator for a Chinese buyer. Individuals are
classified as either Chinese or non-Chinese using the logit classifier in Equation 1. any8 is an indicator
for the presence of any 8 in the address. total8 is the total number of 8 s in the address. building8
is an indicator for the presence of an 8 in the house number. buildingLast8 is an indicator for house
numbers ending in an 8.
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Table 7: Buyer and Seller Ethnicity and 4 s in Addresses, Binomial Classifier
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
chinaSell −0.052∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
chinaBuy −0.028∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
any4 0.004
(0.003)
any4 × chinaSell 0.004
(0.005)
any4 × chinaBuy 0.007
(0.005)
total4 0.003
(0.003)
total4 × chinaSell 0.004
(0.004)
total4 × chinaBuy 0.005
(0.003)
buildingAny4 0.001
(0.002)
buildingAny4 × chinaSell 0.006
(0.004)
buildingAny4 × chinaBuy −0.001
(0.004)
buildingLast4 −0.003
(0.001)
buildingLast4 × chinaSell 0.006∗
(0.003)
buildingLast4 × chinaBuy −0.012∗∗
(0.004)
Num. obs. 508916 508916 508916 508916
R2 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871
Zip Code - Year FE Y Y Y Y
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. chinaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and chinaBuy is an indicator for a Chinese buyer. Individuals are
classified as either Chinese or non-Chinese using the logit classifier in Equation 1. any4 is an indicator
for the presence of any 4 in the address. total4 is the total number of 4 s in the address. building4 is
an indicator for the presence of a 4 in the house number. buildingLast4 is an indicator if the house
number ends in a 4.
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Table 8: Ethnicity and 8 s in Addresses, Multinomial Classifier
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
chinaSell −0.058∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
chinaBuy −0.035∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
any8 0.001
(0.001)
any8 × chinaSell 0.014∗∗
(0.005)
any8 × chinaBuy 0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)
total8 0.000
(0.001)
total8 × chinaSell 0.008
(0.004)
total8 × chinaBuy 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003)
buildingAny8 0.001
(0.001)
buildingAny8 × chinaSell 0.011
(0.006)
buildingAny8 × chinaBuy 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004)
buildingLast8 0.002∗
(0.001)
buildingLast8 × chinaSell 0.019∗
(0.008)
buildingLast8 × chinaBuy 0.007
(0.005)
Num. obs. 508916 508916 508916 508916
R2 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871
Zip Code - Year FE Y Y Y Y
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. chinaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and chinaBuy is an indicator for a Chinese buyer. Individuals are
classified as either Chinese, Korean or non-Chinese using the multinomial classifier in Equation 3.
any8 is an indicator for the presence of any 8 in the address. total8 is the total number of 8s in the
address. building8 is an indicator for the presence of an 8 in the house number. buildingLast8 is an
indicator if the house number ends in an 8.
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Table 9: Koreans and 8 s in Addresses, Multinomial Classifier
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
koreaSell −0.029∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
koreaBuy 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
any8 0.001
(0.001)
any8 × koreaSell 0.001
(0.007)
any8 × koreaBuy 0.007
(0.006)
total8 0.001
(0.001)
total8 × koreaSell −0.000
(0.006)
total8 × koreaBuy 0.008
(0.005)
buildingAny8 0.001
(0.001)
buildingAny8 × koreaSell 0.005
(0.008)
buildingAny8 × koreaBuy 0.012
(0.007)
buildingLast8 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
buildingLast8 × koreaSell 0.003
(0.013)
buildingLast8 × koreaBuy 0.010
(0.010)
Num. obs. 508916 508916 508916 508916
R2 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871
Zip Code - Year FE Y Y Y Y
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. koreaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and koreaBuy is an indicator for a Korean buyer. Individuals are
classified as either Chinese, Korean or non-Chinese using the multinomial classifier in Equation 3.
any8 is an indicator for the presence of any 8 in the address. total8 is the total number of 8 s in the
address. building8 is an indicator for the presence of an 8 in the house number. buildingLast8 is an
indicator if the house number ends in an 8.
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Figure 1: Olympic Athlete Names
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100 most frequent names appearing on the Summer Olympic Games rosters for each country. More frequent
names are indicated with a larger font.
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Figure 2: Solution Path for φ∗(λ)
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(a) Figure 2 displays φ∗(λ) for various λ. φ∗(λ) is the solution to Equation 2. As λ→ 0, the penalty on the
coefficients decreases, and φ∗(λ) becomes the maximum-likelihood estimator. Because of the shape of the
`1 penalty, φ
∗
p(λ) = 0 for some p. λcv is the 5-fold cross-validated and λ1se is the largest λ such that the
cross-validated log-likelihood is within 1 standard error of the cross-validated log-likelihood when evaluated
at λcv.
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Figure 3: Chinese Buyers and Sellers Over Time
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Figure 3 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function for the probability that a residential property
buyer [Pr(Chinese Buyer)] and seller [Pr(Chinese Seller)] for each transaction in the assessor data was
identified as Chinese by the ethnic-name matching procedure. Pr(Chinese Buyer) and Pr(Chinese Seller) are
calculated using the stated buyer and seller names for each transaction, the estimated coefficients φ∗ and
Equation 1.
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Figure 4: Chinese Buyers and Sellers Over Time
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
Year
P
er
ce
nt
 C
hi
ne
se
 B
uy
er
s 
an
d 
S
el
le
rs
Percent Chinese Buyers
Percent Chinese Sellers
Figure 4 displays the number of Chinese Buyers and Chinese Sellers as a percentage of total transactions
over time.
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Figure 5: Fraction of Chinese Single Family Home Buyers by Census Tract
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Figure 5 shows the number of Chinese single family home buyers in a given census tract as a percentage of
total single family home transactions in the census tract. Total transactions begin January 1990 and end
December 2015.
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Figure 6: Location of Single Family Homes Purchased by Chinese Buyers
Figure 6 identifies the locations of single family homes bought by an individual identified as Chinese in
Seattle over the period January 1990 to December 2015.
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